Federalism and centralization in Nigeria by Ross, Stephen



Federalism and Centralization in 1gena 
By 
Stephen Ross 
A Thesi submitted to the 
School ofGraduatc Studies 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
Political Science 
Memorial University 
May2010 
StJohn' Newfoundland 
Abstract 
The following thesis addresses two research questions in relation to federalism in 
Nigeria. First, why, de pite the intemational trend towards decentralization, doe Nigeria 
remain centralized? Second, what affects has this centralization had on the evolution of 
federa lism in the country? The following research proposes that three variables have 
reinforced centralization in Nigeria; 1) the nations historical-colonial origins 2) the oil 
economy 3) the con traints of decentralization and economic reform in federal tates. All 
three variable how centralization to be over-determined, in that all documented 
variables point to the ame conclusion. The affect of this centralization, as predicted by 
the political economy of federa lism literature, includes transfer dependence, budgetary 
deficits at the centra l and sub-national level, macroeconomic in tability, public service 
decay, and rc i tance to public sector reforms. As a whole, this the i will conclude that 
the centralization of Nigerian federalism is both a historical dispo ition and a rational 
preference for contemporary actors and institutions. 
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Introduction 
Since its official territorial con olidation in 1914, Nigeria ha been in a perpetual 
process of integration and unification. With over two-hundred and fifty ethnic groups, 
integration through federalism was and still remains Nigeria 's mo t viable institutional 
means to attain unity in diversity. And given the accommodative and plurali tic e ence 
of federalism as a political process and an institutional result, Nigeria 's federal 
foundations, in theory, appear both rational and efficient (Duchacek, 1970). Y ct, as this 
paper will show, political and economic centralization remain a consi tent constraint on 
the evolution ofNigerian federalism. 
This the is will focus on Nigerian federalism, in particular it oil-ba cd economy, 
fiscal federali m, and the role of sub-national governments. Within the larger framework, 
I wish to address the centralization - decentralization debate that exi ts in the 
comparative federali m literature. My re earch que tions are as follow : a) why, despite 
the international trend towards decentralization, does Nigeria remain centralized? And b) 
what has been the impact of this centralization on the evolution of Nigerian federalism? 
The following research will highlight three independent variables underlying 
Nigeria ' s centralized federal structure: I) the nations historical-colonial origin 2) the oil 
economy 3) the constraints of decentralization and economic reform in federal tate . The 
final section of the essay will outline the effect this centralization has had on Nigeria 's 
economy and administrative structure - outcomes which have been clearly outlined in the 
fiscal federali m/political economy of federalism literature. Overall , my research will 
suggest that both oil and the nation-building requirements covering igcria' past and 
recent history have mutually reinforced centralization in Nigeria. entralization is 
subsequently over-detennined, in that, all documented independent variables make it the 
most likely outcome in the Nigerian context. 
The literature smTounding the causes and origins of federalism is both abundant 
and theoretically varying. Despite the literature's theoretical variations, most authors 
rightfully assume that 'history matters ' , and that the origin of a particular federation can 
have a great impact on its future political and economic trajectory. While this paper will 
provide an overview of the most relevant literature, it will largely focus on how the 
historical origins of some federations, particularly colonial federations, are vulnerable to 
centralization. 
The political economy of federalism also provides concepts and theories that 
dissect, and in some cases predict, the political and economic trajectories of particular 
federal states. While the political economy of federalism remains a theoretically divided 
study, the subject does provide some useful and widely accepted concepts that aid the 
analysis of the economic and political consequences of particular federal processes. This 
paper will concentrate its attention on the theories and concepts associated with 
centralization and decentralization in federal states, with particular emphasis on their 
respective implications for administration and fiscal federalism. 
Equally significant in the political economy of federalism literature is the 
distinctiveness of economic reform in federal states. Many federal states face similar 
problems, both poHtically and economically, that make the transition from centralized 
federalism to market-preserving federalism unique and incomparable to the process in 
other state forms. This is largely due to the fact that sub-national actors and institutions, 
who respond to different incentives and interests than central actors, are often 
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institutionalized veto-players around public policy (Rodden and Wibbels, 2002). Sub-
national governments must subsequently be included in any debate and process that 
affects the finance and function of the state. Hence, any process of decentralization and 
economic refom1 will require the consent of a multitude of actors who may, or may not, 
have incentives to change. 
Another variable that must be controlled to effectively understand centralization 
in Nigerian federalism is that of oil. There are many important consequences oil can 
politically and economically induce across states and it is essential to understand the role 
oil plays in Nigerian federalism. While the background literature will help conceptualize 
the various concepts and theories surrounding the political economy of oil, analytically, 
this paper's chief goal is to understand the relevance of oil in relation to the centralization 
ofNigerian federalism. 
Methodologically, applying the theories and concepts from the ongms of 
federalism, the political economy of federalism, and the political economy of oi l 
inevitably requires a historical analysis of the processes and variables that have motivated 
. and shaped federalism in Nigeria. Federalism, as an institutional framework for · 
coordinating the whole and its parts, is a perpetual process of "unfinished business" that 
can only be understood by conceptualizing the historical evolution of particular federal 
frameworks (Duchacek, 1970). Jn the case of Nigeria, the federal anangements of the 
"present" can only be explained by analyzing the colonial structures, along with the 
intense conflicts and processes that have shaped these structures over time. Thus, 
methodologically, this paper will utilize a historical-institutional approach to adequately 
survey the historical evolution ofNigerian federalism. 
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Yet, as the literature on the political economy of oil and the political economy of 
federal ism will highlight, institutions are not alway~ simply products of the past. Rather, 
as rational-choice institutionalism highlights, political actors and institutions with rational 
and self-interested motives often make decisions irrespective of the constraints of history. 
Individual preferences, in this case, can "motor" the evolution of institutions over time 
and the study of political and economic outcomes should reflect this methodological 
conviction (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005). Thus, to answer our second research 
problem of what impact centralization has had on the evolution of Nigerian federalism, 
this paper wi ll methodologically utilize a rational-choice institutional approach. 
I 
This paper is by no means the first to unify historical-institutionalism and 
rational-choice institutionalism to answer a set of research problems, nor is it the first to 
analyze how contemporary preferences and outcomes are shaped by the past (Mahoney, 
2005; Kaztneson and Weingast, 2005; Weingast, 2005). What is unique to the following 
research is its conviction that decisions made in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria have 
situated and reinforced particular preferences and outcomes that continue to shape the 
evolution of Nigeria's federa l structures. Centralization, as this paper will conclude, is 
both a historical disposition and a rational preference for contemporary actors and 
institutions. 
As a whole, thi s paper is surely not the first to bring f011h a discu sion on 
centralization in Nigerian federalism (Oyovbaire, 1985; Suberu, 2001; Kalu, 2008; 
Ejobowah, 2005; Idemundia and Ite, 2006). Similarly, many authors have also cited the 
historical evolution of Nigeria as being importa~1t in shaping the present day federal 
framework (Suberu, 2001 ; Kalu, 2008; Bakarr Bah, 2005; Rotberg, 2004). Likewise, the 
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affects oil has had on the Nigerian state has also been previously studied by a number of 
authors. from multiple disciplines (Watts, 1987; Ikein and Briggs-Anigboh, 1998; 
Pearson, 1970; Zartman, 1983; Panter-Brick, 1978). Despite such a vast assortment of 
literature, what makes this paper important is its contemporary conceptualization of the 
two research problems. By synthesizing and coordinating variables from an assortment of 
sub-fields in comparative federalism and political economy, this paper will analyze 
centralization with a broad theoretical and conceptual scope, allowing the research to 
sufficiently address the multiple variables and processes that have been consequential in 
the evolution ofNigerian federalism. 
This thesis will be arranged 111 three chaRters. Chapter one will introduce the 
necessary concepts and theories from the relevant literature. This will include a 
discussion of the origins of federalism, the political economy of federalism and the 
political economy of oil. Chapter two wi ll outline the theoretical and methodologica l 
direction of the research problems. Chapter three will apply the concepts and theories to 
Nigerian federalism. This will include the historical-institutional survey of the federation 
and the rational-choice analysis of the political al)d economic affects centralization has 
had on the evolution of federalism in the country. 
Chapter One: Background Literature 
(1.1.) The Causes and Origins of Federal States 
Much has been written on the origins of federalism in various states. For example, 
Alberto Diaz-Cayeros cites a " federal - fiscal compromise" as the main facilitator of the 
federal bargain in Latin America (Diaz- Cayeros, 2006). William Riker sees federalism 
originating from "bargains aimed at achieving military defense against a common 
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enemy" (Rodden, 2004). Some see federalism originating as "successful attempts by state 
builders to replace territorial cleavages with functional cleavages" (Eaton, 2008). Others, 
in the Rikerian tradition, cite the economic advan ages of forging the " incentive for a 
larger and more open market" under federal designs (Hueghlin and Fenna, 2006) 
Of course, not all federations originate from compromise and bargain. While the 
study of American federalism has contributed to the study of federal origins abroad, it 
does not shed light on federations that did not voluntarily come together out of common 
interest. Rather, as Alfred Stepan points out, "as comparativists, we must recognize that 
some of the most important federations in the world emerged from a completely different 
historical and political logic" (Stepan, 2004 ). Many federations are in fact not bargains, 
but products of the "vagaries of conquest and colonialism" (Rodden, 2004). 
It is out of this framework that Alfred Stepan posits three concepts for classifying 
the origins of federalism. "Coming together" federalism would satisfy the Rikerian 
models of American federalism, as well as Canadian federalism, in that, previously 
sovereign units are consolidating together out of shared interest. "Holding together" 
federalism, on the other hand, refers to federations that face wide cleavages within 
society, which induces the central state to consolidate the territory with a "consensual 
parliamentary decis ion to attempt to hold together a unitary state by creating a multi-
national federal system" (Stepan, 2004). Finally, "Putting Together" federalism refers to 
a "heavily coercive eff01t by a centralizing power to put together a multi-national state, 
some units of which had been independent states" (Stepan, 2004). lt is the latter two ideal 
types that this paper will utilize in the Nigeria·n context. 
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In the ca c of omc post-colonial federa tions, it is also probable that the "Putting 
together" and "Holding together" typologies arc the most relevant, as colonialism 
inevitably fostered the conglomeration of a variety of different ethnic groups into single 
territorial units. In Africa, many boundarie , and ub equently states, were constructed 
irrespective of ethnic and religious homogeneity. "State-nations", in thi respect, replace 
the conventional nation-state, as national territories are being con tructed from "above" 
by colonial admini trators (Hughes, 2004), (Duchacck, 1970). 
For Hueghlin and Fenna, this " late- tate formation" had two implications. First, 
some fonn of federalism was necessitated, as it was "the only option for political 
accommodation within the inherited territory" (Hucghlin and Fenna, 2006). Second, 
regionalism became a chal lenge to national development, as federal government became 
arenas for competitive truggles between regional actors. Without a "true federali st 
compromise", the political and economic tatu of the federation inevitably "o ciliated 
between extreme regionalism and authoritarian centralism" (Hueghlin and Fcnna, 2006). 
Concerning colonial institutions, it is both accepted and a sumed that institution 
evolved to suit the economic preferences of the imperial power in question. Thi ts 
inherent in the territorial impositions from 'above' di cussed earlier. However, assuming 
that the origin of a federation will affect it future trajectory, we al o have to expect 
some fonn of in titutional path-dependence. In some sense, the tenitorial imposition of 
imperialism left post-colonial states bound to multiple nationalities, which constrain and 
conditions any future arrangement the central tate may have with its ubordinatc parts. 
Politically, thi means that "once a country or region has started down a track, the costs 
of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchment of 
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certain institutions obstruct an easy reversal of the initia I choice" (Subrahmanyam, 2006). 
Path dependency, in this respect, is an attached phenomenon to post-colonial states 
(Subrahmanyam, 2006). By imposing a state and creating nations out of otherwise 
heterogeneous societies, European powers pre-conditioned all future power relations the 
state would have with society. Centralization became the only means through which 
many post-colonial federations could consolidate and strengthen the national whole. 
Conceptually, this implies that our analysis of Nigerian federalism assumes that 
" institutional anangements cannot be understood in isolation from the political and social 
setting in which they are embedded" (Thelen, 1999). 
As a whole, the literature surrounding the causes and ongms of federalism 
provides a number of concepts that not only help explain the institutional discrepancies 
that exist across federations , but it also highlights how the origins of particular federal 
states can affect future institutional outcomes. This again has obvious methodological 
implications. Federalism is not simply a static concept, but rather, an evolutionary 
process of bargain and negotiation, and one must not neglect the obvious functional 
characteristics of institutions within a federation (Duchacek, 1970; Thelen, J 999). 
Rational-choice institutionalism, holding that self-interested actors use and construct 
institutions for coordinated action, has often been utilized when analyzing the political 
and economic affects of federalism (Thelen, J 999). As rational choice institutionalism 
aspires to explain particular political and economic 'outcomes' , the following study must 
shift its attention to the political economy of federa lism. 
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(1.2.) The Political Economy of Federalism 
As noted above, the literature around the political economy of federalism is 
divergent in both theory and practice. Since William Riker's explorations of American 
federalism in the 1960's, the study of federalism has evolved into a subject concemcd 
with everything from "market preserving" federal structures to political and economic 
policies that enhance federal "sustenance" and durability (Wibbels, 2005; Ejobowah, 
2005). As a generalized whole, "the new political economists argue that what functions 
arc assigned to each level of govemmcnt and the f01m of financing accompanying these 
functions help to explain the success of federalism" (Ejobowah, 2005). Hence, like its 
public finance counterpart, the new federalism has developed a " logic of assignment", or 
essentially "a set of propositions about how the division of policy responsibilities ought 
to be structured between the respective levels of government" (Hueglin and Fenna, 2006). 
In a sense, a union of sorts has formed between Wallace E. Oates' Fiscal Federalism and 
the more contemporary New Public Management prescriptions seen today. This " new" 
political economy of federalism and market reform has in turn influenced the perceptions 
of the World Bank and the federations in the developing world that interact with it 
(Ejobowah, 2005). 
Being aligned with the assumptions of rational/public choice methodology, the 
new political economy of federalism is market-oriented, emphasizing the competition 
between units and an increased efficacy and efficiency of public services through 
decentralized administration. Decentralization and centralization are thereby used 
dichotomously to compare and contrast federations. The level of each concept in a given 
federation can be used to describe "the character and dynamic of power allocation" 
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within that federation (Hueglin and Fenna, 2006). While the political economy of 
federa lism literature will use concepts such as market-preserving and market-distorting to 
conceph1alize federations, it is in many ways reconfiguring the same decentralized-
centralized dichotomy used in comparative federalism and public administration. 
Decentralization, as a static concept, has been defined by a number of authors 
from a wide variety of disciplines. Most authors, however, will typica lly denote it as a 
transfer of power, resources, or administrative capacity from the center to a sub-national 
level (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001; Hucglin and Fenna, 2006; Rodden, 2004). Numerous 
types of decentralization can be defined, however, for classification purposes, two 
spectrums can be highlighted; political and administrative. Political decentralization 
would refer to the transference of decision making powers from the center to the sub-
centers, while administrative decentralization refers to the transference of administrative 
functions from the center to its parts (Loughlin, 2008). The concept thereby refers to the 
"de-layering" of centralized administration, followed by the empowerment of sub-unit 
managers to make autonomous, and implicitly more responsive, policy dcci ions (Larbi, 
2006). However, the concept can also refer to a number of institutional processes that 
deliberately implement a "planned transfer of resources away from the central state 
institutions to peripheral institutions" (Oiowu, 2006). For example, decentralization can 
include the privatization or corporatization of public services. It can also describe the 
processes of devolution , whereby, political and economic autonomy is shifted to the sub-
national units, conferring "self-governing capacities on local communities" (Oiowu, 
2006). Simi larly, Robert Barr describes devolution as a "transfer of decision making 
authority and financial capacity to elected sub-national governments", which facilitates a 
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shift in political and economic power from the whole to its more responsive parts (Barr, 
2006). 
This conceptualization is juxtaposed to centralization, which broadly refers to the 
"concentration of formal power within a single political authority", or a process in which 
the central state commands and controls authority (Gellar, 1990; Hooghe and Marks, 
2003). Under Loughlin 's decentralization typology, political centralization would 
indicate a concentration of decision-making power at the central level, whi le 
administrative centralization would refer to the concentration of administrative function s 
in the central sphere. 
The affects of centralization are all too familiar to developing states. Up until the 
1980's and 1990's, most post-colonial African states had maintained heavily centrali zed 
institutions as a means to guide and pursue rapid political and economic development 
(Wunsch, 1990). Central platming and state-led development had become the accepted 
paradigm for developing federations in the nineteenth and twentieth-century, evident in 
federations as diverse as India, Nigeria, and Mexico. In many cases, the centralization of 
policy functions was simply required, as local and sub-national units grossly lacked the 
proper " infrastructural capacity" to effectively deliver services (Ziblatt, 2006). However, 
by the 1980's, massive debts, seemingly w1controllabie inflation, and huge government 
deficits began to paralyze centralized states. As one author summarizes, "Weak 
infrastructural power at the sub-national level has prompted highly centralized pattems of 
governance in much of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Frustration with centralism has 
generated in turn a pronounced trend towards the decentralization of resources and 
authority to sub-national govemments" (Eaton, 2008). 
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This trend towards decentralization is an imperative foundation to the political 
economy offederalism·. The realities ofthe post-welfare state, and the sense of'overload ' 
apparent in over-centralized states, has produced an array of literature on the 
effectiveness of decentralizing administration in federations. For example, many authors 
have argued that decentralization enhances both democracy and governance by making 
sub-national actors more accountable to local interests (Gomez, 2006; Wunsch, 1990; 
Martinez-Vazquez and Mcnab, 2006; Lijphart, 2002). Hence, as one author concludes, 
"fiscal decentralization and democratic governance can be viewed as two complementary 
processes", whereby, governance provides channels for local constituents to influence the 
sub-national institutions that deliver their services (Vazquez and Mcnab, 2006). 
There exist numerous examples of federations that have embraced and 
institutionalized decentralization. For example, Colombian federalism has undergone 
dramatic decentralization since the 1980's and 1990' s, with increased fiscal capacity and 
incentive structures being devolved to sub-national units (Bird and Fiszbein, 1998). 
Federalism in India has also undergone similar changes, whereby, states have gradually 
been given more economic independence in relation to the foreign capital and investment 
(Singh and Srinivasan, 2006). The decentralization of administrative tasks has also been 
cited as improving services in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, and Brazil (Larbi, 2006; Olowu, 
2006; Smoke, 2006). Hence, as two authors conclude, "each country does what it does for 
its own pmticular reasons, but when so many countries in so many different 
circumstances do somewhat similar things, there is likely to be more at work than meets 
the local eye" (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998) 
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The failures of centralization have also been conceptualized and theorized by 
many. Broadly speaking, administrative centralization is said to produce an " inefficient, 
ineffective, costly, and unresponsive" system of govemance which is largely detached 
from the intricate necessities of sub-national and local units (Larbi, 2006). Centrally 
managed administration is inevitably too detached from "changing human needs and 
motivations to be able to sustain a complex and diverse economy" (Oiowu, 1990). 
Fiscal centralization, or the concentration of public revenue and collection at the 
central level, is one example of such centralized admin istration. Fiscal central ization is 
seen as an obstruction to fiscal sustainability, in that, sub-national institutions become 
dependent upon the central govemment for financial stability, and subsequently, the 
delivery of services. This not only produces the inefficiencies noted above, but it also 
produces a state of "transfer dependence", leaving little incentive for sub-national units to 
reform economically (Asadurian, Nnadozie, Wantchekon, 2006). 1 Transfer dependence, 
as a consequence of fiscal centralization, refers to a relationship whereby sub-national 
institutions lack internally generated revenue and are subsequently guaranteed payments 
from the central government on a regular basis to administer their required functions 
(Hueglin and Fenna, 2006). In economic federalism, the consequences ofthis dependence 
on central revenue are important in validating the decentralization theorem. 
Transfer dependence inevitably serves as a systemic "obstacle to entrepreneurial 
sub-national leaders", in that, policy, no matter bad or good, is fiscally rewarded 
(Wibbels, 2005). The incentive in this system is not to pursue and maximize internal 
revenue, but rather to maximize transfers from the central government. Such " lazy 
1 See Kent Eaton ' s Review A11icle "Federalism in Europe and Latin America: Conceptualization, Causes, 
and Consequences", World Politics, 60 (July 2008), pp. 688- 689 
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monopolies" inevitably receive political benefits from such transfers, however, "the result 
is likely to be chronic overspending", or essentially, unsustainable deficits that further 
deteriorate a state's capacity (Hirschman, 1970; Wibbels, 2005). 
Sub-national spending in a transfer-dependent system, 111 this respect, is often 
executed irrespective of both demand and sustainability. As the state IS annually 
guaranteed its ' piece of the pic' from the central account, no matter its pol itical and 
economic performance, there is no institutional incentive for the sub-national authority to 
seek altemative sources of revenue. In some cases, a state may simply be too important to 
nationa l stability to allow it to fi scally fail, inciting the "too big to fail phenomena" , 
whereby, the state is again guaranteed fiscal upkeep via the center because of its national 
significance (Rodden, 2002; Ejobowah, 2005). ln either case, sub-national regimes in 
transfer-dependent systems wi ll exhibit little to no progress in thei r intemally generated 
revenue (lGR), as the incentive to compete for resources outside the central account are 
non-existent (Hueglin and Fenna, 2006). The consequences are well illustrated by Eric 
Wibbels, as he writes 
Such transfers encourage regional politicians to compete for resources from the common 
pool of national revenues, and the fiscal system itself becomes the subject of intense 
intergovemmental bargaining. The very ground rules of the federal system become the 
subject of political gamesmanship. One central implication is that regional government 
resistance to market reforms will mount as their dependence on transfers increases, which 
will vary both across regions within federations and across federations themselves 
(Wibbels, 2005) 
The central government, in this respect, is a sphere to be lobbied by sub-national 
governments. This politicization of functional revenues is inevitably problematic, as 
"politically motivated rescue packages for friends at the regional level" could be 
disastrous for the macroeconomic status of t.he federation as a whole (Wibbcls, 2005) 
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Fiscal and public sector expansion is al o practically inevitable within such a system, 
hence, " the momentum for downsiz ing and devolution is a lso supported by the 
presumption that overexpansion and cxce ive centra lization are inherent in the pol itica l 
process" (Musgrave, 1997). 
lt should a lso be noted that if sub-nationa l government' s Lack interna lly generated 
revenue, it 's very like ly they a re spending more than they tax. Given that one of the 
pi llars of fi scal federa lism is that there is "geographic variance in demand for publicly 
pro ided good ", the implication for fiscal fede ra lism and the location-ba ed theory arc 
immense (Musgrave, 1997). 
Tiebout's loca ti on thc01y 1s qu ite implc; "the benefits of public goods and 
services arc con umcd jointly, but differ in the ir spatial range. Their provis ion should 
therefore be decided upon and paid for by the res idents of the area that benefits" 
(Musgrave, 1997). If fisca l production docs not match public consumption, as evident in 
a transfer-dependent system, " the delivery of ervices will become mixed w ith 
distr ibutional considerations", again resulting in big budgets and poorly crafted budget 
functions (Mu grave, 1997). Centra l transfer , in this respect, become " resource 
distOJ1ing" when like ub-national units " must be treated differently in di fferent 
geographical areas a a rc ult of the tran fer" (Buchanan, 1952). Hence, w hen production 
ceases to match con umption and sub-units are financially dependent on the center, the 
fiscal costs of ub-national spending are externa lized across the federation as a whole. 
More directly, " regiona l voters, politician , and rcpre entatives at the national level all 
receive fi ca l and/or political benefits from transfer ystems, while impo ing the costs on 
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others in federations" (Wibbels, 2005). In thi paper's analysis of centTalization m 
Nigeria, this externalization of costs will be of importance. 
All these concept and theories surrounding fiscal centralization arc also dissected 
and analyzed within the literature surrounding competitive federalism. Broadly speaking, 
competitive federali m can be defined a a "view that a system of multiple juri dictions 
creates the potential for individuals and firms to defect from a particular regime whose 
policies they dislike" (Hucglin and Fenna, 2006). It can also denote a federal framework 
in which "state and local officials determine their own policic in part based on 
competition with urrounding communitic " (Volden, 2002). In either case, the goal of 
competitive federali sm is "aimed at providing the right services at low cost, and at 
designing efficient and equitable tax systems" (Musgrave, 1997). Competition within 
federalism can al o be divided into two subficlds; Vertical competition and horizontal 
competition. Horizontal competition. refer to "competition among governments at the 
same level or with similar responsibilities", or inevitably inter-jurisdicitional competition, 
while vertical competition refers to competition that involves di Ffcrcnt levels of 
government with different types of responsibilities (Shah, 2006). 
The co ts and benefits of horizontal competition within a federation have been 
documented by many. The most fruitfu l analy i i provided by Anwar hah (2006), who 
cites four main benefits, all of which share conceptual allegiance to the fi cal federalism 
tradition. First, a documented in Tiebout 's location tbeoty, horizontal competition will 
bring services in line with local preferences, allowing voters to "vote with their feet" and 
force sub-national authorities to provide more responsive and competitive policies. 
Second horizontal competition wi ll subsequently bring about bottom-up accountability, 
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in that, sub-national government's will be more inclined to " retain the loyalty of their 
citizens", who could migrate to a more politically and economically attractive region 
under a competitive framework if its local ub-unit does not implement adequate policy. 
Third, horizontal competition could loosen the grip that monopolies and corrupt officials 
have on public services by again enforcing local autonomy and fiscal accountability. 
Hence, the adverse incentive structures that operate in an uncompetitive system will be 
reversed. Fourth, horizontal competition reinforces fiscal competition between sub-
national governments, which in tum, force sub-national actor to offer competitive 
taxation to foreign and domestic busine ses. 
Like; the literature on transfer-dependence, horizontal competition at o highlights 
. the importance of political and economic incentives within a federation. Incentives can 
come in the form of block grants for meeting particular initiative , or an increase in 
autonomy for ub-national au_thoritie in relation to foreign inve tment. In either case, 
incentives arc expected to be maximized under a decentralized structure, as "stronger 
incentives for effort stem from incrca cd autonomy from central control" (Rodden, 
2005). 
Hence, ome authors simply cite intctjurisdictional competition a another 
manifestation of decentralized governance (Bartley, Andersson and Laerhovcn, 2008). 
Incentives, in thi respect, are integral to breaking away from the hazards of centralized 
federalism. This is evident as one author remarks, "without appropriate incentives -
understanding that they (actors) face demands from a V;:Iriety of different stakeholders -
these actor arc likely to neglect or even subvert their new respon ibilitie , thus 
frustrating reform efforts. The idea that institutional incentives arc crucial and complex in 
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multilevel systems resonates with broader critiques of the literature on federalism and 
economic performance cross nationally" (Bartley, Andersson and Laerhoven, 2008). 
The uniqueness of economic reform within federal systems has also been 
highlighted by a number of different authors in the political economy of federalism 
literature (Wallack and Srinivasan, 2006; Wibbels, 2005; Rodden and Wibbels, 2002). 
Reform, in this case, is a characterization of the structural adjustment policies many 
federations have undertaken since the 1980's. This includes the privatization and 
devolution of public services and hard constraints on government spending. Federally, it 
includes the processes of decentralization discussed above. 
As documented in the introduction, the uniqueness of economic reform in 
federations stems from a combination of variables. First, administratively, federalism 
inevitably increases the number of veto players around policy, particularly at the regional 
and/or sub-national level (Wallack and Srinivasan, 2006). As a result, sub-national actors 
and institutions must be consulted and are subsequently important in "shaping economic 
reform processes" (Wibbels, 2005). Second, the very logic of federalism holds that sub-
national actors respond to different interests and incentives than national actors, albeit 
regional and local interests. Such regional and/or local input subsequently checks the 
power of the central authority. ln these circumstances, however, its likely national and 
sub-national interests will differ, and at times, directly oppose. Hence, its understandable 
that "federalism can pose major challenges to the coordination of economic policy 
challenges" (Wibbels, 2005). 
Many federations thus face political and economic problems with "distinctly 
federal roots" (Wibbels, 2005). ln some cases, these problems may be a result of 
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conflicting interests between national and sub-national actors. For example, in 2000 
states in India openly blocked the privatization of state-owned electricity companies 
(Wibbels, 2005). For Wibbels, such resistance to public sector reforn1s at the sub-national 
level is existent because "consistent with the institutional design of federalism, regional 
decision makers have responded to their own electoral incentives and in doing so have 
often eschewed the austerity and political uncertainty associated with major economic 
initiatives" (Wibbels, 2005). lt was also well documented that the power of sub-national 
govemments in Brazil "limited the central government's options with respect to fiscal 
adjustments" during the refonns in the late 1990's (Rezende and Afonso, 2006). 
Some cases highlight the necessity of fiscal refom1 at the sub-national level. As 
alluded to in the literature sunounding transfer dependence, soft budget constraints at the 
sub-national level can have disastrous economic outcomes. In Argentina, fiscal deficits at 
the sub-national level produced the federation ' s economic collapse in 200 I. State debt at 
the regional level in Brazil produced similar outcomes in the late 1990' s . In both cases, 
the macroeconomic consequences of loose budgets at the sub-national level were 
immense. The logic of such behavior at the sub-national level was simple; "with little 
electoral responsibility for macroeconomic performance and various institutions that 
foster overspending, sub-national governments sometimes extract resources from the 
center with little concern for the potential impact on the federation as a whole" (Rodden 
and Wibbels, 2002). 
1nstitutionally constraining such sub-national spending inevitably requires fiscal 
reform. Paradoxically, any such reform requires the consent of sub-national governments, 
the very actors who foster overspending in the first place. And given that states that 
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overspend are often doing so with centrally transferred finances, it becomes clear as to 
why sub-national governments would be against refonning such loose fiscal rules. To 
state it bluntly, who would want to stop spending money that is not theirs when they face 
no consequences for doing so? 
Other cases highlight how change-resistant national governments constrain 
reformist sub-national actors. This is exemplified in Russian federalism, as economic 
reform has been guided by the Putin regime with increased political centralization 
(Berglof, Kunov, Shvcts, and Yudaeva, 2003V In Russia, the central government 
obviously instituted a number of economic reforms from the early 1990's onward , 
including a reduction in govemment deficits and an increased openness to the private 
sector. However, economic reform in the post-Yeltsin era has also accompanied the fiscal 
and political disempowerment of sub-national governments and institutions. This process 
is best explained by Donna Bahry, as she writes 
The federal government also imposed some other, less obvious constraints. The centers 
inability to create an effective market infrastructure, with clear and stable property rights, 
effective legal regulation, and consistent rules for h·ade and foreign investment, limited 
the opportunities for sovereignty minded regions to attract direct foreign invesh11ent or 
develop substantial foreign trade tics for all the most lucrative products (such as oil , gas, 
diamonds etc). The most lucrative commodities, in turn, were subject to various federal 
controls, from quotas and licensing requirements to pipeline access. The regions were 
tim~ left with limited prospects for developing an external economic base to counter 
federal power (Bahry, 2005) 
All cases within the literature on federalism and economic reform highlight the 
relevance and intensity of intergovernmental conflict in shaping the economic reforn1 
process. The experiences of federations as diverse as India, Brazil, and Argentina also all 
highlight the problems in transitioning from a centralized federation to a market-
2 This paper also intends to highlight a simi lar case in Nigerian federalism 
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preservmg model. Hence, the fact that economic reform, and subsequently 
decentralization, IS extraordinarily difficult in a federal setting bas also been well 
documented. 
As a whole, the political economy federalism provides concepts and theories that 
can help explain why Nigeria remains centralized, as well as highlight the political and 
economic affects of centralized federalism. Yet, to explain and apalyze centralization in 
Nigeria, our research requires more analytical tools outside the comparative federalism 
framework. Nigeria is one of the largest oil producing states in the world, and to not 
include its accompanying affects would be counterproductive to the study of Nigerian 
federalism. Hence, the following section will discuss the role of oil in Nigeria. 
(] .3.) The Political and Economic Effects of Oil 
It is no secret today that most oil producing developing states have "suffered from 
economic deterioration and political decay" (Karl , 1997). lt is also no secret that many of 
these states, despite their internal variances, all navigated and sustained similar 
" trajectories" because of the massive influx of petro-capital (Karl , 1997). ln this respect, 
" it should not be surprising that states dependent on the same revenue source resemble 
each othe_r in specific ways" (Karl , 1999). 
Similarly, while post-colonial federations are vulnerable to political path-
dependence, many high/high capacity commodity-producing states are also ubject to 
economic path-dependence. Given that " the development of a particular industry or 
economy may be affected by the decision to invest in one fom1 of technology over 
another", economic choices are again constrained by the high cost inputs already devoted 
to the industry in question (Subrahmanyam, 2006). For the public sector, such inputs 
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include the itmumerable government agencies established to monitor and regulate the 
sector in question (Shafer, 1994). For the private sector, it includes the established sector-
specific firms and technologies operating in congruence with the state. For oil-producing 
states, the costs of diversification and exit are thus immense. Hence, "the high barriers to 
change arising from · thei r leading sector produces inettia: both organized interests and 
state bureaucrats tend to fight to maintain the status quo and to prevent modifications that 
might eclipse their standard operating procedures" (Karl, 1997). 
Another common characteristic of oil-producing, developing states was their 
wi llingness, to varying degrees, to nationalize and gain managerial control of the sector 
in question (Shafer, 1994; Ascher, 1999; Karl , 1997). Entrenching the state in a high/high 
capacity sector is of course nom1ally justified on the basis of revenue expansion, and 
subsequently, its implication for revenue distribution. Nationalization also allows 
govemments to subsidize, and under-price, both costs and outputs throughout the 
industry (Ascher, 1999). For oil-producing states, typical examples are sta te-owned oil 
companies, such as Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), Venezuela ' s Petroleos de Venezuela 
(PDVSA), and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Maily of these 
state-owned companies went on to institute politically popular price ceilings on outputs, 
which more often than not included artificially low gasoline prices to stimulate 
industrialization (Ascher, 1999). Other 's simply constrained multi-national actors and 
companies, favoring "domestic expansion in oil exploration and production", which 
fmther entrenched the state in the sector while producing an abundance of central 
government finance (Ascher, 1999). The results, in many cases, were however disastrous. 
Not only did oil become over-exploited because of its under-pric ing and seemingly 
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endless supply, but government subsidies inevitably grew with the onset of inflation, 
paradoxically making domestic fuel consumption a losing venture for the government 
(Ascher, 1999; Karl, 1997). And when governments began to decrease and cut these 
subsidies to control their expanding deficits, output congruently declined, discouraging 
future productivity and harming "the sector's long-run revenue potential" (Shafer, 1994). 
The nature and consequence of the misuse of oi l revenue by states has also been 
well navigated. The pseudo-mythic ' Resource Curse' proposes both political and 
economic explanations as to how states spend oil revenues and why such spending has so 
many negative consequences. While this research is mainly conccmed with highlighting 
the effects oil revenue can induce in regard to centralization, a brief analysis of the 
resource curse will be helpful in framing the common characteristics of oil-producing 
states in the developing world and documenting how these characteristics figure into 
Nigerian federalism. 
The concept of the resource curse has been explored and evaluated in an 
assortment of disciplines and literature. Subsequently, three common characteristics of 
the curse have been identified by political scientists and economics alike; rents and rent-
seeking, commodity market volatility, and the "Dutch Disease".3 
Resource rents are said to produce a "rentier-state", whereby, resource revenue is 
utilized by the state at the expense of taxation to produce an apparatus of monopolized 
distribution (Karl , 1997). Rent-seeking in the oil industry can mold attractive 
opportunities for state officials in affairs of contracting and construction, facilitating the 
3 These are the theoretical attributes utilized by Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian in "Addressing the Resource 
C urse: An Illustration from Nigeria" (2008). The significance of these characterist ics are also noted in 
Michael Ross ' "The Political Economy ofthe Resource Curse" (1999) 
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"petrolization" of both politics and state institutions (Watts, 1987; Karl , I 997). Under this 
"petro-statc", actor and institutions inevitably become disillusioned with the initial sense 
of irrational optimi m, guarding the organized tatu quo at the expense of progressive, 
' 
democratic policy (Karl 1997). 
Like govcmments in a centralized fi cal ystcm, petro-state bureaucracies and 
institution will maximize budgets in an effort to maintain the flow of organizational 
rents. For Karl, this unconstrained rent- ccking and spending contain a ''self-
perpetuating dynamic; the greater the budget, the more clients, and vice versa" (Karl , 
I 997). And with the flow of rents into public in titutions come the intertwining of 
economic and political rationality, leaving politica l actors to rely on the "progressive 
substitution of public spending for statecraft" (Karl , I 997). The tate, not the private 
sector, become the mo t dominant economic organization in society. The con cquences, 
or the curse, arc apparent with institutional decay, organized corruption , bad economic 
management, and un-democratic regime which consume the state and control its 
revenue. 
The volatility of markets, particularly commodity markets, i al o undoubtedly a 
problem faced by all resource-rich state . With oil prices, the great boom and bust in the 
1970's and 1980' makes evident how volatile and erratic oil prices can be in the 
intemational economy. Similar fluctuation have been apparent in 2008 and 2009. The 
affects of this volatility, however, is expected to vary from state to tate, depending on 
how attached a par1icular domestic economy i to a particular commodity. If an economy 
is diversified enough to withstand the shocks, a was lndone ia, one can expect a more 
limited affect. However, if an economy has become dependent on one particular resource, 
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like Nigeria, economic decline is expected to be detrimental to a state's capacity. Thus, to 
understand the varying affects resource dependence has on states require a di cussion of 
the third attribute of the resource curse. 
Getting its title from the decline of the manufacturing sector upon the di covery 
of oil in the Netherlands in the 1960's, the Dutch Disease is more or lc s related to the 
issues of fluctuating commodity ,markets. A oil exports grow, one can expect an 
appreciation of the tate' s real exchange rate. Import demand rise as foreign exchange 
grows rapidly and the cunency appreciate , leaving non-oil export and many dome tic 
producers completely uncompetiti ve. The aggrcs ivc inflow of "pctro-capital" lead to a 
boom in non-tradablcs, such as the civil crvicc, which only further the plight of 
domestic producer (Watts, 2004; Collier, 2008). Capital and labor inevitably gravitate to 
the oil sector, which completely crushes the non-oil ector, creating an economic ystem 
that wholly depends on , and fluctuates with, the re ource in question. In the case of oil, 
the entire economy becomes attached to the boom and bust cycle. With the bu t comes 
economic decay. And if the state has become wholly reliant on oil to prop-up its 
institutions and crviccs, state-capacity is expected to wither with the bust. 
All three manifc tations of the re ource curse explored above have been 
documented in Nigeria. For example, both Watts and Karl cite 1gcna a a pnme 
example of a rcntier, petro-state (Watts, 2004; Karl, 1997). Both authors also assume that 
politically and economically self-interested, organized networks arc the forces that shape 
and direct the petro-statc. The reasons why these elite actors consume the tate i assumed 
to be the rational advancement of economic and political self-interest, i.e; money and 
power. Hence, Karl cites the prevalence of u ing oil revenue to fo ter the "private 
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incomes" of military elites, at one point discounting other explanations as simply "other 
factors" in shaping the Nigerian state (Karl, 1997). Similarly, Watts claims that struggles 
over the petJ·o-state are fueled by "the desire to gain access" to rents and petro-revenue 
(Watts, 2004). Hence, for both authors, the petro-state is an end in itself and there exist 
no . underlying variables of relevance for understanding why this apparatus has been 
molded in the first place. 
Dutch Disease and the economic affects of resource dependency have also been 
applied to Nigeria. For example, Collier claims that over zealous public spending is what 
caused Dutch Disease in Nigeria (Collier, 2008). Similarly, Nyatepe-Coo cites 
government policy towards import-demand as the facilitator of Dutch Disease (Nyatcpc-
Coo, 1994). Both authors also neglect the distinct history of Nigeria, again leaving the 
reader to assume that the Dutch Disease and an over-exposure to oil price fluctuations arc 
simply inherent features of the con·upt and poorly managed Petro state. And according to 
much of the literature above, this corruption and mismanagement are simply by-p roducts 
of the assumed self-interested networks that make up the petTo-state apparatus. 
This paper by no means contests the observations made by the above authors, nor 
does it dispute the analytical convenience of the resource curse in dissecting the political 
economy of Nigeria. However, the conceptual framework of the resource curse docs 
underestimate the historica lly distinct processes that have shaped and motivated the 
political and economic centralization of Nigeria since its inception. This has, in turn, 
made the underlying structures of Nigerian federalism practically incomprehensible to 
anyone who seeks to understand why it remains centralized. While oil is undoubtedly of 
great significance to understanding this central ization, it should not be analyzed as the 
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sole independent variable, or subsequently, the only element capable of inducing 
centralization in Nigeria. To ask why Nigeria remains centralized, incompetent economic 
policy making, greed, or oil should not be the only variables utilized in our analysis. 
Overall , federal or not, oi l-producing developing states have fe lt the burdens of 
the above affects. Dependency on oil-revenue to politically and economically prop up the 
state leaves all administrative bodies fragile. In federal systems, being overly-dependent 
on any one source of revenue has already been shown to be of consequence for sub-
national incentive structures. Hence, if a federa l government becomes dependent on oil 
and subjects its subordinates to the same dependence via revenue allocation, we would 
also expect that federation to exhibit the consequences of transfer dependence highlighted 
earlier. Similarly, by entrenching and institutionalizing the central government in the oil 
sector, many oil-producing states were extremely vulnerable to fiscal centralization, as 
the center became the most powerful sphere both fiscally and administratively. And 
again, once the initial decision is made to economically entrench the cenh·al state in a 
high/high capacity sector, the likelihood that it will exit and decentralize the sector is 
very slim. 
Chapter Two: 
Theoretical and Methodological Framework 
Theoretically, this research suggests that three variables have mutually reinforced 
centralization in Nigeria; 1) the nations historical-colonial origins 2) the oil economy and 
3) the constraints of decentralization and economic reform in federal states. Nigeria, 
consequentially, continues to exhibit the predicted affects and burdens of cenh·alized 
federalism: transfer dependence, budgetary deficits at the cenh·a] and sub-nationa l level, 
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macroeconomic instability, public service decay, resistance to public sector reforms, and 
un-competitive federali sm. 
follows 
The three independent variables utilized in the this research can be summarized as 
(1.) Historical-Colonial: Nigeria was "put together" by Great Britain, which 
conditioned all future anangements between the center and its parts. After the 
civil war, the military began to centralize to "hold together" the country. 
Centralization was a response to the ethnic and religious regionali sm that 
threatened the nation. 
(2.) Oil-Economy: Oil has been conducive to centralization in o il-producing 
states tlu·oughout the world. Once a state becomes economically attached to a 
high/high capacity commodity, there is no turning back. Centralization becomes 
irrevers ible. 
(3.) Constraints of Decentralization and Economic Reform: Decentralizing 
and devolving a centralized federa tion is extremely difficult because 
administratively, federalism increases the number of veto players around policy, 
particularly at the regional and/or sub-national level. Any process of 
decentralization and economic reform w ill require the consent of a multitude of 
actors who may, or may not, have incentives to change. 
By utiliz ing all of the above indepen'dent variables as tools for the case study, my 
research affirms multiple-causation on the dependent variable, which in this case is 
centralization in Nigerian federalism. Methodologically, this implies that my research is 
inherently asserting a case which exhibits a "plurality of causes", or inevitably a case in 
which "the same outcome can be caused by combinations of di fferent independent 
variables" (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). It is not the goal of my research to suggest 
whether or not the same outcomes would be apparent if one of the three independent 
variables were removed. While the counterfactual could be argued for each respective 
independent variable, such analysis would be strictly normative and inevitably detached 
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from the realities of contemporary Nigerian federalism. Hence, my paper presents a 
"focused and relevant description" of a case that appears to exhibit problem encountered 
in a number of sub-disciplines within comparative politics and comparative federalism 
(King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994). 
For the rational-choice theorist, centralization is an inherent consequence of 
Nigeria being a " petro-state" (Karl, 1997). Similarly, the concepts utilized in the political 
economy of federali m and economic reform all assume actors and institutions to be 
driven by rational and self-i nterested motives, hence, their allegiance to the public choice 
discipline. Yet, as alluded to in the opening section on the origins of federalism, history 
has been known to have profound consequences on decision makers. 
As some authors point out, "from historical-institutionalism, we adopt an interest 
in how the legacies of past policies condition the present" (Bartley, Andersson, Jagger, 
and Laerhoven, 2008). While there exists a divide in the literature as to how institutions 
evolve in relation to the actors that navigate them over time, this research hopes to move 
beyond the dichotomous ' structure versus agency ' paradigm in its institutional analysis . 
ln this sense, the following research can be traced to what Thelen calls the "border 
cross.ers", where the different schools of institutionalism, both rational choice and 
historical, are brought together to explain a specific ques tion (Thelen, 1999). Hence, the 
following case study ofNigerian federalism will continue in the methodological unity of 
rational-choice institutionalism and historical-institutionalism (Katznelson and W eingast, 
2005). 
This research assumes actors 'in the Nigerian context to be rational and self-
interested, as prescribed by the public choice school. These rational actors are in turn 
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expected to maximize their interests within a constrained historical-institutional 
environment. As the history ofNigeria will highlight, the operative historical-institutiona l 
constraints are politically and ideologically influential to local, sub-national, and national 
level policy makers. While one can imagine a scenario where self-interested preferences 
may outweigh historical constraints, a scenario can also be envisioned where core, 
rational interests correspond to and coordinate with historical-political variables 
(Mahoney, 2005). Hence, as one author proposes, "when ideological principles and other 
core interests (for example, personal political interests) clash, actors wi ll frequently forgo 
the former to pursue the latter. Of course, when ideological principles and core in terests 
are consistent, it is easy for actors to behave consistently with their ideology" (Mahoney, 
2005). 
Theoretically, this implies that " induced preferences may be invoked forcefully 
by the logic of strategic interaction among actors within circumscribed institutional 
contexts" (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005). Such ' institutional contexts' refer to the 
"shadow of the old regime" and the rules and nonns that were institutional ized by these 
regimes (Bartley, Andersson, Jagger, and Laerhoven, 2008). 
Chapter Three: Application and Analysis 
(3.1) The Historicai-Jnstitutional Evolution of Nigerian Federalism 
Nigeria, like many Africa states, is a colonial creation. In some sense, Nigeria, as 
a geographic entity, has no binding, historical and social essence. Rather, the very 
foundation of Nigeria is based solely on the territorial and institutional conceptions of 
colonial Britain . Conceptualizing Nigeria as a "state-nation" also finds resonance in other 
post-colonial African states, where, unlike Europe, the developing state is making the 
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nation based upon the geographic and demographic boundaries founded by colonial 
administrator (Hughes, 2004). Nigeria, in this ca c, is also a clear example of 'Putting 
Together' federalism, in that beginning in the late 19th century, fonncrly autonomou 
communities were teJTitorially consolidated by Great Britain for administration and 
revenue, irrespective of the degree of social cohesiveness. 
Prior to the arrival of the British, Nigeria was composed of numerous 
communities, chiefdoms, and city states. Many of these system were governed ei ther 
through the Sokoto Caliphate of the N01th, or the Benin and Yoruba Empires of the 
South. While the e y tcms did maintain omc degree of autonomy and interact with one 
another economically, there remained many ungoverned areas, uch as the Jo Plateau in 
Nigeria's Middle Belt region, and the valleys of Niger and Bcnuc (Oyovbairc, 1985). 
There a lso existed numerous village republics, uch as the lgbo and Gwari , which were 
independent of the aliphate and the Southern Empire . In both case , before the British 
and Portugtle e landed in what is modern day igeria, there existed multiple forms of 
governance with distinct ethnic proccs c and relationships. There cxi ted no unifying 
institutional or governmental structure that bound together all the state and communities 
of modern-day N igcria. 
Between the late 19th and early 20th century, Great Britain consolidated it rule in 
Nigeria through the econoniic integration caJTied out by the Royal Niger Company. Upon 
establishing rule in Lagos in 1 861 , the British mapped out a process for the 
commercialization ofNigcrian agriculture (Oluwasanmi, 1966). This wou ld al o mark the 
beginning of wage labor and direct taxation, along with a rail ervice to link Lagos and 
the Northern tcrritoric . This would in turn economically integrate the developed South 
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and underdeveloped North.4 In doing_ so, Great Britain strengthened its ties across the 
country, establishing indirect rule in the North and South West through Native 
Administrations (NA) (Ojo, 1998). In the Middle Belt region, direct rule was established, 
as colonial wanant chiefs were instituted. By 1900, the contemporary boundaries of 
Nigeria had been established. The N01th and South of the tenitory were subsequently 
amalgamated in 1914 under the leadership of than British governor general Frederick 
Lugard. 
From 1914 onwards, the British would conceptualize Nigeria in terms of North 
and South. This would divide the Northern Hausa/Fulani, who practice Islam, from the 
Southern Yoruba and lgbo majority, who practice Christianity and other indigenous 
faiths. In many ways, the origin of the N01th-South division was based more upon 
religion than ethnicity, as the British were very careful not to extend Christian missionary 
education into the fom1er Islamic caliphate. In 1938, the South was ethnically divided 
into East and West regions, with the Yoruba being the majority of the West and the lgbo 
the majority of the East. Hence, the tripartite, ethno-regional structure was instituted with 
the three largest ethi1ic groups being recognized regionally. This system was formalized 
and institutionalized with the Richards Constitution of 1946, and subsequently furthered 
with the Macpherson Constitution in 1951. In turn , it was this system that brought 
Nigeria to independence.5 
Upon independence, the first constitution called for a federation of the three 
regions, all operating under a parliamentary system. The central house of representatives 
4 The Delta regions, and subsequently the East and West, had been integrated into the international 
economy well before the North. This is in part due to its coastal benefits, as well its rich and plentiful palm 
oil industry. 
5See fi gure two in Appendix 
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was partitioned by population, hence, the North was given the largest regional 
representation based upon the 1953 census figures prepared by the British. It is important 
to note that the NPC (N011hern People's Congress) would take the most seats in 
parliament at independence, with Hausa Abubakar Balewa becoming Nigeria 's first 
prime minister. The institutions existent at independence inevitably allowed the NPC to 
dictate and "project its regional dominance" in the federal arena due to it's geographic 
and demographic size (Suberu, 200 I). This not only conditioned contention at the federal 
level, but also perpetuated conflict between the ethno-regional units and the federal 
govemment. The political arena had become a sphere through which the three largest 
ethnic groups could compete for resources and power, making institutionalized confl ict 
inevitable. 
Federally, the first constitution hamessed a weak central govemment with strong 
ethno-regional structures, producing a "fragile system of communal competition" which 
"failed to emphasize Nigerian identity" (Rotberg, 2004; Bakan Bah, 2005). By granting 
regions 50% of their derived mineral revenues, the federation 's sub-national units had 
also become relatively economically autonomous. The derivation principle would also 
guide the fiscal arrangements for each sub-national govemment in relation to the federal 
authority (Ejobowah, 2005). Thus, as one author notes, "When national politics was 
dominated by the powerful three regional governments in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
each wanted to derive maximum benefits from the natural resources located 111 the 
geographic area it controlled; hence, the regions pushed for a great emphasis on the 
derivation principle" (Phillips, 1991) 
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By also granting each region its own constitution with independent judiciaries and 
police forces, a system of "structural imbalances" was created, crafting a federal 
framework that inevitably facilitated attempts at secession (Bakan Bah, 2005). While the 
federal government maintained the provision for Peace, Order and Good Government, 
along with emergency powers, the decentralization of the country in the first constitution 
would be one of the strongest factors in the democratic deterioration of the first rep ubi ic. 
Ironically, the economic benefits of the tripartite federation were the total 
opposite. Between 1950 and 1959, agricultural exports grew from £78.6 million/year to 
£ 139.4 million (Oiuwasanmi , 1966). Local autonomy allowed the palm oil indust1y to 
flourish in the east, whi le rubber and cotton rapidly developed in the North and West 
regions (Ejobowah, 2005; Oluwasanmi, 1966). Most importantly, the Briti sh and 
Nigerian govemmcnts bad come to rely on peasant farmers to fUJ1her commercia lize the 
tenitory's agriculture. The peasant had become the "dominant veh icles of modern 
economic expansion", and Nigeria had become an economica lly " intense, competitive, 
and vibrant" . federation (Ejobowah, 2005; Oluwasanmi, 1966). The economic 
significance of oil had yet to be realized. 
Despite its promising economic development, the institutionalization of cthnicity 
at the sub-national and federal level left the country in continuous political conflict. In 
1962, with the fracturing of the Yoruba-based Action Group and subsequently the 
Western Region, the federal government declared a state of emergency, suspending the 
region's constitution and legislature. This led to the division ofWestern Region into the 
Midwest region, instituting a four-region structure. This division was supported both by 
the Igbo dominated NCNC and the Hausa/Fulani NPC. While both the NCNC and NPC 
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claimed the creation of Midwest Region was based on the need for accommodation of 
ethnic minorities6, it was largely perceived as a means to fractu re the Yoruba electorate 
and disassemble the AG and its leader Chief Awolowo. Whatever the case, the creation 
of Midwest region not only facilitated future ethnic rivalry at the federal level , but also 
began a long, turbulent history of minority claims for more territorial autonomy. 
In 1962, the issue of population and census figures a lso became a sphere for inter-
ethnic conflict. The first post-independence census would not only reconfigure regional 
representation in the House of Representative, but would also determine the size of the 
different ethnic groups. And given that the size of ones ethnic group often determined the 
degree to which that group is represented, territorially and institutionally, it was 
inevitable that the census would be ethnically politicized. 
It should be noted that the census figures eventually revealed 111 1963 were not 
widely accepted, pa11icularly by the lgbo East. Such suspicion was also apparent in the 
1953 figures documented by the British, which declared the Northern Hausa to constitute 
55% of Nigeria 's population. The census of 1963 simply re-politicized population count , 
a scenario that had been apparent with census taking in Nigeria since the early 20111 
century. In many respects, as Lany Diamond notes, the 1963 census produced not simply 
ethno-regional conflict, but ethnic rivalry at the community level. The message with the 
creation of the Midwest region, and the politicization of the census, had been simple; 
"power and resources depended on numbers" (Diamond, 1983). However, the 1963 
census figures would be accepted by the federal govemment w ithout the support of the 
Igbo East, as both the fractured West and newly created Midwest aligned with the NPC to 
6 This includes the Jjaw, ltsekri , and some middle belt minorities 
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approve the numbers by vote. The ten ion the e census figures facilitated between the 
Hausa/Fulani and lgbo would explode into civil conflict in 1966. 
The official end of the First Republic, and thus decentralized fedcrali m, is 
nom1ally associated with Nigeria's first military coup, which witnc cd lgbo military 
officers, led by General Ironsi, take control of the federal government in 1966. Ironsi 
claimed to be ridding Nigeria of its extensive regional and ethnic loyalties. However, 
lronsi 's rule produced mass rioting and violence between the Hausa/Fulani and lgbo, 
resulting in the o erthrow of Iron i six month later by Yakubo Gowon, a military officer 
of Anga de cent, an ethnic group from the Middle Belt region. During Iron i' removal, 
inter-ethnic violence between Hausa/Fulani's and Igbo's left thou ands dead. This 
inevitably mobilized the Eastern region, which was now led by an lronsi appointee, 
General Ojukwu. The 1966 military coup and counter coup were directly motivated by 
ethnicity. It became apparent that the institution designed for Nigeria at independence 
were simply ill equipped to deal with inter-ethnic conflict. In many rc pccts, the military 
began justifying its rule by the notion that the centralization of command in Nigeria wa 
the only means to dismantle ethnic rivalry. Such views would significantly affect future 
governmental tructurc . 
However, a noted above, the Iron i appointee, lgbo General Ojukwu, still 
controlled the Ea tern Region after the counter-coup in 1966. While General owon had 
convinced the Hausa/Fulani to accept a federal formation that did not allow regional 
entities to dictate central government proceeding , Ojukwu and the entire Eastern Region 
remained embittered over the killing of Jgbos in the North following the Iron i coup. 
Despite the warnings of the Gowon-led military government, General Ojukwu was gi en 
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the mandate by the Eastern regional leg islature to secede from Nigeria on the twenty-
seventh of May, 1967. Ojukuwu declared the Eastern Region to be the Independent 
Republic of Biafra. That very same day, Gowon declared a state of emergency in the 
federation. Jn doing o , the Gowon admini .tration abolished the four region structure, 
decreeing the creation of a twelve state federation . The ethnically driven civil war, which 
lasted from 1967 into J 970, subsequently began. 
The decree of the twelve-state Federal Republic in 1967 marked the end of 
regional structures in Nigeria, w hich have never returned. The decree also completely 
redefined territoriality in Nigeria, transforming the politics of ethnic identity throughout 
the federation. 
The Eastern Reg ion was divided into three separate states. Six states were created 
111 the North and six states in the South. While six out of twelve tates were 
predominantly populated by fom1cr ethnic minorities, there till existed deep ethnic 
division within these new states. For example, the Jjaw and Itsckri still contested their 
absorption into Mid-West state, while the Iga la still sought autonomy from Kwara state. 
In this respect, Gowon 's decree had po liticized many ethnic groups that had not been 
institutionally accommodated before the 1966 coups.7 
Since the civil war, N igerian fcdera li m ha never been the amc. Between J 967 
and the brief return to democracy in 1979, the Supreme Military ouncil would 
completely reassemble Nigerian federalism, mo tly by decree. The centralization of 
Nigerian fcderali m by the military would lay the evolutionary grounds for ' Holding 
Together' federali m, a direct response to the conflict arising from the nation building 
7See figures three and eight in Appendix 
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process. Centralization was the only means to subdue ethno-regional conflict and 
consolidate the territorial whole. While one could point to the later Babingida and 
Abacha regimes as sources of centralization in their own right, their regimes were merely 
continuations of the same ideological principles that motivated the military in the mid-
1960's. If anything, the most lasting affect of the multiple military regimes that followed 
the Second Republic of 1979 was their perpetuation, and further entrenchment of, the 
'Holding Together' state introduced in the 1970's. 
Revenues in the 1970' s were thus nationalized in the Federation Account, thereby 
transferring the budgetary and financial powers of the sub-national units to the central 
govemment. This also effectively dispelled the use of the derivation principle as a means 
of distributing resource profits. Equity, need, and population became the new vocabulary 
in Nigeria's post-civil war fiscal environment. In the 1970's, the central authority would 
also begin to regulate and abolish sub-national taxation, including commodity export 
duties and personal income tax (Suberu, 2001). Similarly, the delivery of services, such 
as housing, education, and health care were all transferred to the central government 
(Oiowu, 1990). Hence, as one author notes, "Changes in the nature of federal financial 
relations were among the most striking features of nearly fourteen years of military rule 
in Nigeria" (Rupley, 1981 ) . 
Whi le fiscal centralization would have been nearly impossible in the early 1960's, 
1969 would see the beginnings of an oil boom that would last well into the 1970' s. For 
the Supreme Military Counci l, oil would be treated as a national resource, whereby all 
revenues accruing from its exploitation would go to the Federation Account. These were 
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then to be distributed equally across states.8 Oil was now the instrument by which 
national economic and tenitorial consolidation could be furthered. In this manner, oil 
"assisted the military in centralizing power" by providing the state with a means to 
institutionally, economically, and tenitorially consolidate Nigeria (Oiowu, 1990). Thi 
wa institutionalized with the Petroleum Decree (Decree No. 51, 1969), with the central 
government regulating the " importation, storage, sale, and distribution" of oil 
(Akiosanya, 1983). Similarly, Decree No. 18 in 1971 created the Nigerian National Oil 
Corporation (NNO ) later to become the Nigerian ational Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC), which partly nationalized the oil indu try and subsequently increa ed the federal 
government's share of crude oil to be sold internationally (Onoh, 1983). 
State creation also continued to be utilized as a means to accommodate ethnic 
minorities, and in some cases, divide them. In 1976, seven more state were added to 
Gowan's twelve- tate federation, which would include the divi ion of N01th Eastem 
State and We tern State into three states each, and Benue-Piateau, Ea t Central , and 
North West into two tates each (Suberu, 200 I ). 9 In 1976, the central government also 
~reated a system of 30 1 Local Government , all funded by the federal authority. This 
number would increa e to 774 by 1996. In 1987, Akwa Ibom and Kat ina were also 
created, and finally 1996 would witne the creation of six additional tate . Thi would 
bring the total to thirty-six states, with 774 local govemment area .10 This entire proces 
of state and local creation has inevitably led to the "pullulation of smaller and weaker 
units of constituent governments, the proliferation of nanower administrative-territorial 
8Suberu's Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria (200 I) provides a good overview of the history of 
revenue sharing in Nigeria 
9See figure four in Appendix 
10See figures fi ve, s ix and seven in Appendix 
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identities, and the consolidation of centralized federal power" (Suberu, 200 I). The long 
term effect of the re-definition of territory in Nigeria has thus reinforced the 
centralization ofthe state. 
The entire process of centralization undertaken by the military after the civil war 
would be constitutionally recognized in 1979. The I979 constitution that marked the 
beginning of the Second Republic would also be the blueprint for the 1999 constit·ution, 
which is what governs Nigeria to this day. The affects of this institutionalized 
centralization since the civil war have been diverse, yet in many respects, continuous. 
One of the most significant additions to the I979 constitution, and subsequently 
the 1999 constitution, was the Federal Character Principle (Suberu, 200 I). As the 
con titution states, the Principle served the "distinctive desire of the peoples of Nigeria to 
promote na~ional unity, foster national loyalty, and give every citizen of Nigeria a sense 
of belonging to the nation" (Akande, 1982). This would affect everything from political 
parties and political participation, to the armed forces and the civi I service. 
Given that political parties were the vehicles of inter-ethnic struggle in the first 
republic, the 1979 constitution placed strict limits on party registration. Here, under the 
Federal Character Principle, parties bad to maintain membership and representation in 
two-thirds of Nigeria ' s states. In doing so, the central government was nationalizing the 
political process and altering the "functionality" of political parties in Nigeria 
(Oyovbaire, 1 985). Similarly, the composition of the executive had to maintain the same 
attributes. In this sense, support from one ethnic group could not propel any candidate to 
power. Leadership and political participation were now national, de-institutionalizing 
ethnicity and de-legitimizing it as a source of mobilization. 
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The Federal Character Principle also completely nationalized the military and 
police service . Thi not only allowed the executive to appoint Nigeria' chief of police 
and state police commissioners, but it also abolished the local police y tcrl1S established 
in the First Republic. In doing so, force and coercion would no longer be ethnically 
motivated, a tate were prohibited from fund ing and operating their own ccurity 
apparatus. While this would later produce security problems of its own, it is important to 
note the conceptua l significance of thi constitutional clause. Coercive force was no 
longer considered a regional and ethnic function. The central Nigerian tate would 
transform the armed forces into a multi-ethnic, national force, again de-legitimizing 
cthnicity a a ourcc of coercion and law enforcement. Law and order was thereby 
enforced from the center, not from the fragmen ted particulars. 
lf anything, the 1979 and 1999 con titutions symbolized the commitment of the 
igerian authoritic to national unity beyond cthnicity. While ethnicity wa undoubtedly 
recognized a a ourcc of diversity and multicultural identity in 1979, it wa completely 
?anished from government and the public service. To mobilize and participate, functional 
interests were required. This would suppo cdly facilitate inter-ethnic cooperation, 
grounded in common social and economic intcrc t. 
The military' re ponse to territorial fragmentation in the late 1960' wa by no 
means unique to the developing world. Military juntas and authoritarian regimes 
throughout the world have long justified the centralization of the tate as the only means 
to consolidate a divided nation. What is unique to the centralization undertaken by the 
military in Nigeria i the fact that the "holding together" federalism in tituted by the 
military wa a direct re ponsc to Nigeria ' "putting together" origin. And to revert back 
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to the literature around political path-dependence, "once a country or region has started 
down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but 
the entrenchment of certain institutions obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice" 
(Subrahmanyam, 2006). Hence, when the "holding together", central ized framework was 
institutionalized in 1979, it created a mirage of new actors and institutions that would 
naturally reject any future policy that attempted to reduce their fiscal and administrative 
scope. Centra lization became incversiblc. 
Thus far this research has c tabli hed the historical-institutional roots of 
centralization in igcria . However, a prcviou ly documented, in titution are not imply 
products of the past. Actors with rational motive wi ll shape political and economic 
processes, and Nigerian federalism is no different. While the 'Holding Together' 
institutions left behind by the military inevitably constrain the interests and motivations 
of present political and economic actors, the e present actor and in ti tutions ti ll have 
rational motives that dictate their political and economic behavior. Hence, the following 
cction will now revert to the concept of the political economy of federalism and the 
political economy of oi l to examine the ccond and third independent variables. ln doing 
o, the following ection will also articulate how centralization has affected tgenan 
federa lism politically and economically. 
(3.2) The Political and Economic Effects of Centralization in Nigeria 
Fiscal centralization has inev itably produced transfer dependence in Nigeria. In 
the early 1960's, the relatively autonomou region had generated upward to 40% of 
their revenue internally. By the 1980's, the internal revenues of state had been reduced 
to just 13% (Ojowu, 1990). By 1990, the average rate of fiscal dependence for state on 
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the central government had risen to 80.98% (Asadurian, Nnadozie, Wantchekon, 2006). 
Hence, between 1983 and 1995 the central government's share of pubic spending 
increased by 22% (Suberu, 200 I). It is no surprise that North em states, such as Kano, 
Niger, Bauchi and Bomo, have all been dependent on the central govemment for over 
90% of revenue, particularly in the 1990' s (Asadurian, Nnadozie, Wantchekon, 2006). 
Similarly, between 2001 and 2005, Local governments also received 89% of their 
finances from the federal government (Ekbo and Englama, 2008). As of 2009, thirteen 
states generated less than I 0% of their own revenue and only Lagos State managed to 
generate over 50% of its own revenues (Orogun and Ezigbo, 2009). Consequentially, as 
of 2009, the national average of intemally generated revenue at the sub-national level sits 
around 12% (Aiyenimelo, 2009). The lack of internally-generated revenue has left states 
and local govemments incapable of meeting even their smallest constitutional 
responsibilities. In this sense, even the most basic "operational revenues" at the sub-
national level require federal sustenance (Suberu, 2001). 
As documented in the literature on federalism and economic reform, one central 
implication of transfer dependence is that "regional government resistance to market 
reforms will mount as their dependence on transfers increases" (Wibbels, 2005). The 
extreme degrees of transfer dependence apparent in Nigeria has led sub-national units to 
do just that. The most dependent Northern states, such as Kano, have directly opposed the 
devolution of resource revenue via the derivation principle seen in the early 1960's 
(Suberu, 2001 ). They have similarly rejected fiscal reform, particularly the principles of 
internal revenue generation (Ejobowah, 2005; Suberu, 2001 ). The logic of such anti-
reformism is simple; without the revenues generated from central transfers, many of these 
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states would institutionally deteriorate (Ejobowah, 2005). Because of transfer 
dependence, non-oil bearing states now have a vested economic interest in maintaining 
the ineffective system of fiscal centralization. Without such unconditional transfers, sub-
national actors and institutions would not be able to maximize public sector spending for 
electoral reward, nor would they be able to continue the longstanding practice of 
clientelism. 
The case of transfer dependence in Nigeria also confirms the s ignificance of thi s 
paper's third independent variable, in that, shifting from a centralized, market-di storting 
system to a decentralized, market-preserving system is shown to be an extremely di fficult 
process. Many state and local governments in Nigeria have no incentive to boost internal 
revenue and internalize costs, hence they have no incentive to change the present, over-
centralized fiscal system. This is most visible with the lack of growth in Internal Revenue 
Generation throughout the federation. Naturally, the status quo of fi scal centralization is 
politically acceptable to the actors that benefit the most from it. 
With the bulk of government finance coming from the Federation Account, 
spending at both the central and sub-national levels also continue to go unchecked. 
Consequentially, domestic debt rose from $8.6 billion in 1999 to over $13 billion in 
2006, the very years the PDP-led central government was supposedly reforming the 
governmental spending process (Okogu and Kwaako, 2008).11 Similarly, external debt in 
the 1980's and 1990's at one point equaled 70% of Nigeria's export earnings (Gu eh and 
Oritsejafor, 2007). Jn fact, when the military under General Babangida resumed contro l 
of the country in 1985, Nigeria's debt equaled upwards to 66% of its tota l GDP 
11 AII US dollar equivalents listed are based on US/Naira exchange rate on I April of the year being 
documented. April I" was chosen arbitrarily as exact dates are unava ilable. 
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(Asadurian, Nnadozie, Wantchekon, 2006). By the early 1990's, government deficits 
alone, both central and sub-national, had reached 8% of total GOP (Lewis and Stein, 
1997). Subsequently, between 1991 and ] 993, the CBN's financing of government 
expenditures increased by 359%! (Lewis and Stein, 1997). While the Obansanjo 
administration was able to dramatically reduce its extemal debt between 1999 and 2006, 
the central government continues to seek finance from the international community 
(Gillies, 2007). This includes a N21.5 billion loan for commercial agriculture projects 
from the World Bank in 2009, equal to $143 million USD, as well as an estimated Nl.6 
trillion loan to cover budgetary deficits in 2009, equal to $10 billion USD (Leadership, 
2009; Onu, 2009). The central governments external debt has thus seen yearly increases 
since 2006, again during the supposed years of fiscal reform under the PDP-led central 
government (Editorial, 201 0). As of 2009, Nigeria's total domestic debt equaled $21 
billion, a substantial increase from the $13 billion recorded in 2006 (Akintola, 201 0; 
Chinwo, 201 0). Under the 2009 budget, the central government is also expected to run a 
deficit of upwards to $5.5 billion USD, or N836.6 Billion, equal to 5.7% of the country's 
GOP (Aderinokun, 2009). Aggregate government expenditure is expected to increase by 
31 % in 20 I 0 (Uzuegbu, 2009) 
Budgetary deficits have also become a normality at the sub~national level. 
Between 2001 and 2005, again during the supposed years of fiscal reform, state 
government deficits averaged 5% of total annual revenue, revenue which was by and 
large financed by the central government (Ekpo and Englama, 2008). Local governments 
during the same time period also sustained a deficit. As of 2009, total deficits at the sub-
national level equaled nearly N800 billion, equal to $5.4 billion USD (Esu, 2009). 
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Famous are the stories of unconstrained spending at the state level inN igerian federalism. 
For example, as of 2009, the Ondo state government was in debt by upwards to N I I 7 
billion, equal to $78 I million USD, which the pre ent government projects will take 
about ten years to erase (Sowole, 2009). The Bcnuc tate government i expected to run a 
deficit of upwards to N2.4 billion in 2009, equal to $1.6 million U D, after the 2008 
budget a llocated nearly N900 million, or $6 million USD, to a statc-televi ion project that 
i stil l under con truction (Nwakaudu, 2009). As of 2009, Lagos, Oyo and Kaduna states 
al o remain externally indebted well over I 00 million USD each (Onurah, Ogbodo, and 
Daka, 2009). Likcwi c, between 2007 and 2008, only eleven states actual ly reduced their 
externa l debt stock while twenty-six state increased their foreign debt (Debt 
Management Office, 2007; Debt Management Office, 2008). As of 2009, total foreign 
debt held by tate governments equaled $1.7 billion dollar , leading the Debt 
Management Office to comment that "There is no state in the country that i not 
indebted" (Ahmed, 2009). 
Such uncon trained spending at the ub-national level is a direct consequence of 
fisca l centralization and the transfer dependence it induces. Again, to revert back to the 
literature on fcderali m and economic reform, "with little electoral rc ponsibility for 
macroeconomic performance and variou in titutions that foster over pending, sub-
national government ometimes extract resources from the center with little concern for 
the potential impact on the federation as a whole" (Rodden and Wibbcl , 2002). Sub-
national government's in contemporary Nigerian federa lism, like those seen in Argentina 
and Brazil throughout the I 990 ' s, do not generate revenue internally. Hence, they 
predictably pend well beyond their mean , as such spending faces no political 
46 
repercussion. Again, to state it bluntly, who would want to stop spe1?ding money that isn 't 
theirs when they.face no consequences .for doing so? 
The macroeconomic consequences of such unconstrained spending have nat11rally 
been immense. As forewarned in the political economy of federalism literature, deficits at 
the sub-national level have . been extcmalized across the entire federation, tapping 
govemment revenue and forcing the central government and the central bank to 
continuously pump money into indebted government institutions. This has had negative 
implications for monetary policy, the exchange rate, and the business climate as a whole. 
With such unsustainable spending, the Naira continues to be erratic and volatile, 
perpetuating consistent bouts of inflation. Hence, between 1999 and 2006, inflation 
remained in the double digits, peaking as high as 25% in 2005 (Adam and Godcri , 
2008). As of 2009, the rate continues to hover around 15%. While 2007 and 2008 
witnessed a rise in private-sector credit growth, the business climate continues to be 
lamented for its lack of stability, particularly noticeable in the oil industry and the 
banking and manufacturing sectors (Lawai, Salimonu, and Smith, 2009; Norbrook, 2009; 
Abdulaziz, 2009). The inability of "successive Nigerian governments to susta in a 
conducive environment for operational efficiency" has inevitably constrained an 
economy that was once projected to be the II '" largest in the world by 2050 (Editorial, 
2009; Lawai, Salimonu, and Smith 2009). 
This process is further complicated when considering the notion that most of this 
central government finance derives from oil revenue. With upwards to 80% of 
govemment revenue accruing from oil, public finances tlu·oughout the federation have 
become attached to the volatility of oil prices. 
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As predicted by the political economy of federalism literature, fiscal 
centralization has also hampered the delivery of basic public services. The " lazy 
monopolies" foretold by Hirschman have proliferated throughout the Nigerian public 
service. For example, s ince its inception in 1972, the monopoly held by the Nigerian 
Electric Power Authority (NEP A), now known as the Power Holding Company of 
Nigeria (PHCN), has led to a "widening gap between demand and supply" (Oiukoju, 
2004). Continuous power outages and enatic supply in urban centers remains a chronic 
problem (Lawai, 2007; lriekpen, 2009). Despite the subsidies and shares held by the 
federal government, the company had actually accrued a debt of up to N4 billion, or $42 
million USD by 1999 (Dare, 2002). As of 2010, this debt has increased to the range of 
N459 billion, equal to $3 billion USD (Ezigbo, 20 I 0). It is now estimated that the federa l 
government wi ll have to spend upwards to N177 billion, or $1. 18 billion USD, in 
subsidies between 2009 and 2012 to mainta in delivery across the country (Vanguard, 
2009). Despite being a pi llar of reform for both the Obansanjo and Yar' Adua regimes, the 
PHCN remains a monolith in the Nigerian power sector (Jriekpen, 2009). And despite 
calls for further decentralization in the power sector, the PHCN still continues to fight 
"the tide of change" that is privatization (Maduako, 2009). Thus, not only does the PHCN 
highlight the predicted failures of centralized service delivery, but it also highlights the 
obstacles that exist in the decentralization process. 
Similar deterioration has also been documented 111 the Nigerian police force 
(O iowu, 1990; Ejobowah, 2005; Walker, 2009). 12 Often projected as the "world 's most 
conupt police force", the service remains a manifestation of past military administra tions 
12 The BBC's Andrew Walker produced a series of very informative articles on the police services in 
Nigeria in 2009. 
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(Obaji Ori, 2009). By centralizing the police force, the federal government sought to 
eliminate sub-national coercive powers that had facilitated armed conflict in I 967. 
However, its affect has been dramatic. ln some cases, security has completely 
deteriorated and local militias have risen in response. Local vigilantes have practically 
prospered under the centralization of police services, seen with the rise of groups such as 
the Bakassi Boys, O 'odua People's Congress, and countless other groups mobilized with 
unemployed youth (Pratten, 2008). Many of these groups, however, arc simply providing 
a defense against theft, robbery, and violence which often goes without persecution 
because of the weak and deteriorating Nigerian police service (Prattcn, 2008). 
As of 2009, rcf01ming the inefficient national-police force in favor of more sub-
national authority in domestic security remains stalled (Akoni, 2009; Obaji Ori, 2009). 
Likewise, while the Yar'Adua administration continues to promote reform, the obstacles 
are immense, as institutionalized interests within the security services continue to resist 
changes to the present system (Timothy, 2008; Obaji Ori, 2009). As a result, security 
remains fragile in both the North and South of the country. The Nigerian police force thus 
not only demonstrates the failures of centralized service delivery, but it also shows the 
constraints that act upon the decentralization proce s. 
The Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) also continues to hamper shipping services. 
While its pa1tial-privatization under the Obansanjo regime has led to increased 
investment in the shipping industry, the NPA continues to constrain the development and 
competitiveness of shipping, and subsequently trade, in Nigeria (Oji and Agu, 2008). For 
example, between 1980 and 2002, Nigeria's share of total shipping traffic in Africa 
dropped from 19% to 5% (Cameron, 2003). Likewise, a World Bank report in 2006 
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showed Nigeria's import documentation requirements to be grossly excesstvc 111 
comparison to p01ts around the world (World Bank, 2006; Oji and Agu, 2008). lts also 
been estimated that between 2001 and 2002, stevedoring costs in Lagos were 267% 
higher than in other West African p01ts! (Oji and Agu, 2008). lt also should come as no 
surprise that in 2009, the NPA 's former chairman Olabude George, who is also the 
former PDP leader, was prosecuted for illegally awarding and splitting contracts to the 
tune of N84 million during the pa1tial privatization process, equal to $530 thousand 
dollars (Abdulah and Adcjuwon, 2009). 
Devolving the NPA and reforming the shipping industry, however, inevitably 
faces its obstacles. As predicted in the federalism and reform literature, organized 
interests at the sub-national level continue to resist the full privatization of shipping 
authority. While decentralizing the NPA would save the central government billions, 
"privatization is not politically acceptable to different stakeholders, especially the 
organized private sector" (Oji and Agu, 2008). The NPA is not only an example of the 
inefficiencies that often characterize centralized service delivery, but it is also a clear 
illustration of the consh·a ints and obstacles that exist in transitioning from a centTa lizcd 
federation to a decentral ized, market-oriented structure. 
Similar centralized inefficiencies have been seen in the oil industry. Unlike NEPA 
and the NPA, however, the central ization of oil has had both micro and macro economic 
consequences. As expected, Oil began to consume the economy during the boom of the 
1970's. Between 1970 and 1998, Nigeria would be completely dependent on o il exports, 
never falling be low 91.2% of its total. From 1970 to 1979, oil accounted for nearly 98% 
of Nigeria's total exports (Asadurian , Nnadozie, Wantchekon, 2006). Hence, "the 
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concurrence of the oil boom and fiscal centralization bred a transfer dependent system 
lacking appropriate accountability and proper incentive structures" (Asadurian, Nnadozie, 
Wantchekon, 2006). 
The period between 1970 and 1979 also marked the beginning of the post-civil-
war boom, which witnessed the creation of a large civil service and a vast array of public 
services to lead the new, unified and centra lized Nigeria out of underdevelopment 
(Oiowu, 1990). This entire process of enhancing the state's reach would be f1.mded by the 
central state via its col lected oil revenue. Thus, state capacity in Nigeria became 
dependent upon the price and stability of oil as a source of revenue. While this 
undoubtedly contributed to the rapid penetration of the state into society during the 
1970's, it would also subsequently be the demise of the Nigerian state with the collapse 
of projected oil prices in the 1980's. The massive, centralized-state apparatus constructed 
in the I 970's, subsequently, began to deteriorate in the 1980's. 
In partially nationalizing and centralizing the oil sector in the late 1960's, the 
central govemment also inevitably constructed an array of sectoral distortions that 
continue to plague the economy to this today. As seen in Indonesia in the 1970's, 
Nigeria's subsidization of domestic petroleum has led to intense over-consumption, 
facilitating a black market for smugglers who can make millions selling cheap petroleum 
products abroad (Ascher, 1999; Walker, 2008). Such smuggling has been estimated as 
consuming nearly I 0% of Nigeria's daily oil output (Carroll, 2003). Gas flaring also 
continues go unchecked, which the World Bank predicts consumes nearly 40% of all gas 
in the country, an estimated loss of $2.5 billion USD yearly (Walker, 2009; Muhammad 
and Shosanya, 2009}. While the Yar' Adua administration continues to press for the 
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decentralization of petroleum prices, it inevitably faces obstacles from both organized 
labor and other actors and institutions that benefit from the costly, centralized price-
cei lings on petrol (Aminu and Amanzc-Nwachuku, 2009; Komolafe and Ahiuma-Young, 
2009; Editorial , 2009). Hence, the centralization of petroleum pricing and distribution not 
only highlights the failures of centralized service delivery, but it also highlights the 
constraints that act upon the decentralization process. 
As an independent variable, oil has had two important implications. First, by 
entrenching itself in the production and distribution of oil, the federal government gave 
itself enough finance to both perpetuate and further entrench centralization well into the 
1990's. Oil, in this respect, is again a means by which to centralize, as " the growth of the 
federal budget from petrodollars made the competing local governments increasingly 
dependent on transfers from a vastly enlarged federal pool" (Karl, I 997). Second, by 
institutionalizing the center's place in sector, the state inevitably created an abundance of 
public and private interests that benefited from such centralization, making the costs of 
reversal and/or diversification extremely high. And as predicted by the po litical economy 
of oi l, once the initial decision is made to economically entrench the central state in a 
high/high capacity sector, the likelihood that it will exit and decentTalize the sector is 
very slim. 
As of 2009, debate around the decentralization and privatization of the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) also continues to take place. While the 
company has been lamented for its inefficiencies for nearly two decades, it still remains a 
state-owned monol ith in the Nigerian oil industry. The corporation continues to receive 
generous government subsidies, while at the same time it is granted the privilege of direct 
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access to funds from the federation account (Ekpo and Englama, 2008). 13 Yet, as of 2009, 
the corporation continues to be abused politically, fuel scarcity is still apparent, and 
refineries remain inoperable (Igbikiowubo, 2009; Folasade-Koyi , Lazarus, and Oham, 
2009; Ojeifo, 2009). As of 2008, the state-owned oil company was in debt to the tune of 
N 17 billion, equal to $ 144 mi Ilion USD, and was later probed for discrepancies and 
misappropriations in its accounts (Nduwugwe, 2008; Da Costa, 2009). Similarly, the 
company has long been a haven for coJTuption and unauthorized spending, which 
subsequently facilitates undercapitalization and decl ines in output (Ascher, 1999). 
Despite such blatant centralized inefficiencies, the NNPC, under the guise of the centra l 
govemment, has already declared its stakes in the nationally-significant Trans-Sahara 
pipeline project (Muhammad and Umar, 2009). Likewise, the oil-sector reform bill that 
has been at the forefront of the Yar' Adua administration 's agenda since 2008 continues 
to be resisted by multiple sets of interests, including state govemments and Delta 
politicians from the South who claim the restructuring and reform of the NNPC is 
"against the region" (Folasade-Koyi and Gbemudu, 2009). The National Assembly is also 
expected to filibust the bill upon its submission in the fa ll of 2009 (Lawai, Salimonu, and 
Smith, 2009). Again, this a clear example of how sub-national interests and institutions 
can have adverse affects on the federation as a whole. While slowly decentralizing and 
incentivizing the NNPC would save the central government over N640 billion in yearly 
subsidi es alone, equal to $4.2 billion USD a year, sub-national actors and institutions in 
the South-South region arc quite naturally objecting to policies that would implici tly 
bring job losses to their respective states. Again, the NNPC not only highlights the 
13 In 2008, the NNPC received an estimated N640 bi llion subsidy ti·om the government . 
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predicted failures of centralized federalism , but it also show the obstacles that exist in 
the decentralization process. 
The affect of relying on oil for national maintenance and consolidation would 
also inevitably be di astrous. Agriculture, which had employed up to 70% of all 
Nigerians leading into independence, went from accounting for 42% of a ll export in the 
late 1960's, to just 3% in 1985 (Oiuwasanmi, 1966; Nyatepe-Coo, 1994). In this ame 
period, the production of cocoa dropped by 43%, while the production of groundnuts and 
cotton dropped by 65% respectively (Nyatepe-Coo, I 994). By 2005, agricu lture 
accounted for j u t 0.2% of all expmts. igeria i evidently a cia sic ca e of the 'Dutch 
Disease' . 
Dutch Disease in Nigeria, like many of the state 's problem , has been policy 
induced (Collier, 2008 ; Asadurian, Nnadozie, Wantchekon, 2006; Lewi , 1994). For 
example, both ma ive public sector spending and the governments lack of action 
towards import demand in the 1970' ha been linked to the deteriora tion of non-oil 
sectors in the economy (Collier, 2008; Nyatepe-Coo, 1994). In many respects, the 
institutionalization of centralized federa lism created a system that was simply 
irrespon ive to local demand. Jn the ca e of agriculture, policy was being made that 
simply did not account for the diver e practice of production that exi t acros the 
country (Oiuwa anmi, 1966).14 As one author points out, the political/military eli tes 
throughout the 1970 's and on into the 1990's also no longer depended on the "surp luses 
generated by peasant producers" (Watts, 1987). Hence, "as producer incentives 
disappeared", o did the agricultural sector (Watts and Lubeck 1983). While it is 
'"Oluwa anmi's Agriculture and Nigerian Economic Development provides a sound overview of the diverse 
rules and practices different e thnic groups have in relation to land, prope1ty rights and labor. 
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impossible to draw a causal link between the centralization of Nigerian federalism and 
the Dutch Disease, it should be noted that the country's institutional framework was 
responsible for many of the problems facing the agricultural sector from the 1970's on 
into the 1980's. For example, by abolishing the regional marketing board system in 1973, 
the central govemment relinquished all power sub-national authorities had in relation to 
agriculture, subsequently depriving sub-national govemments of their biggest source of 
intemal revenue (Oyovbaire, 1985). Likewise, by subsidizing and fixing the prices of 
food crops in the early 1970's, the centra l govemment completely distorted the sector, 
facilitating declines in both labor and productivity (Oyovbaire, 1985; Ogbonnaya, 20 I 0). 
The central government essentially crafted a federal framework in the 1970's that was 
incapable of socially and economically responding to the decline of agriculture (Suberu, 
2001; Rimmer, 1978). 
The unresponsiveness predicted by the political economy of federalism school is 
thus quite clear in the case of agriculture. Again, centrally managed administration is 
inevitably too detached from "changing human needs and motivations to be able to 
sustain a complex and diverse economy" (Olowu, 1990). And as noted above, the 
diversity and intricate peculiarities of land and agriculture for different groups in Nigeria 
makes any broad, centralized policy seem miscalculated and estranged from local 
realities . Theoretically, it should thus not come as a surprise that the recent improvements 
in agricultural exports throughout the federa tion have come at a time when the central 
govemment is embracing the decentralization of agriculture (M ailafia, 2008; Kwaka, 
Adenikinju, Mousley and Owusu-Gyamfi , 2008). For example, sub-national govemments 
are now able to promote fore ign investment in agriculture, independent of the constraints 
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of central planning (Osagie, 2009; Sanni, 2009). 15 Similarly, the Yar-Adua administntion 
continues to promote land rcfom1s which will significantly devolve decision making over 
property. This is being promoted as a mean to "make land a much more easi ly 
convertible asset that can be used with les hindrance to raise capital" (Thi Day, 2009). 
The centralization of Nigeria has at o institutionalized an endemic of corruption 
that continues today. Tales of fraud, misappropriation of funds, and the disappearance of 
state transfer have plagued Nigeria's international reputation for year . Between 1999 
and 2003, Tran parcncy Tntcmational ranked igeria the most corrupt country in the 
world (Gusch and Orit cjafor, 2007). ln 2008, former president Olu cgun Oban anjo was 
accused of paying £25 million to a non-existent company (BBC, 2008). 16 Likewise, 
former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar may also be facing charge in regards to illegally 
rewarded energy contracts. These arc just a few examples of how con·upt Nigeria has 
become. Again, a with the Dutch Disease, it i impos ible to directly link COtTuption to 
the centralization of the tate. However, the 'Holding Together' , centra lized in titutions 
that were strengthened after the civil war have been conducive to it mani fcstation, in 
that, corruption and the misappropriation of public revenue simply remain institutionally 
insulated from adequate and legitimate oversight. ln this respect, "the blc ing of oil in 
Nigeria is that it brings in lots of money. The curse is that it concentrate that money in 
few hands" (Watts and Lubeck, 1983). By strengthening institution without the proper 
channels for political and economic accountabil ity, Nigeria has effectively perpetuated a 
centralized state apparatu that rewards bad governance. Public pending, no matter how 
15 The website tradeinve tnigeria.com is a forum for foreign investment opportunities throughout Nigeria. 
The website is promoted by Africa Investment Publishing and can also be accessed via journal. 
16 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ africa/7304028.stm 
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deleterious in the long run, is politically rewarding in the short run, and centralization 
only further entrenches this cycle. 
Overall, the effect that centralization has had on Nigerian fcderali m correspond 
to the experience of many other developing federations. For example, as 111 
contemporary Ru sian federalism, the Nigerian central government continues to 
negatively affect foreign investment because of its entrenchment in the economy. While 
the shipping, petroleum, and power sectors could attract billions of dollar in investment 
and advance the quality of service delivery, the central state continue to obstruct any 
such investments because of its role in relation to the private sector. Hence, as one author 
remarks in reference to Nigeria, "high debt profile and the loss-making business of the 
state-owned utility monopolies arc major impediments to ready acccs.s to finance from 
financia l institution " (Talapragada and Adcbusuyi, 2008). Similarly, a experienced in 
Indian federalism, the decentralization and privatization of state-owned companies has 
proven to be a slow and difficult ta k, largely due to the fact that many of these 
companies have political and economic interest of their own that, more often than not, 
do not correspond to the interests of the federation as a whole. Likcwi c, as documented 
above, the behavior of sub-national governments appears to be much like tho c een in 
Argentina and Brazil in the 1990's, in that, not only do they continue to over pend 
because of their dependence on central financing, but many continue to constrain the 
decentralization proces because ofthis very dependence. 
Conclusions 
In the end, this paper's reasons for methodologically unifying both rational-choice 
and historical in titutionalism is clear in its abi lity to help us explain both why Nigeria 
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remains centralized and how it has affected the evolution of its federal framework. For 
example, while transfer dependence is a historical facet of the years of fiscal 
centralization undertaken in the 1970's, it has nevertheless reinforced behavior at the sub-
national level that is consistent with the assumptions of rational-choice individualism, 
that being of course their tendencies to overspend for political gain when they face no 
costs for doing so. Similarly, while the NPA, NNPC, PHCN and the police services arc 
all historical products of the centralization of service delivery undertaken by the military 
after the civil war, they too have been shown to have their own interests that cannot be 
explained solely with historical analysis. Likewise, while the quasi-nationalization of the 
oil sector by the central govemment in the 1970's would entrench the state in the 
economy and pre-condition all economic activity in the future, it has nevertheless 
facilitated such behaviors as over-consumption, smuggling and rent seeking, that can 
only be explained with the assumptions of the rational-choice framework. 
As for the three independent variables examined in this research, all have been 
shown to have mutually reinforced centralization to this day. The first independent 
variable, the historical-colonial, highlighted the premise that Nigeria 's 'Putting Together' 
origins conditioned all future relations between the central govemment and its 
subordinates. 'Holding Together', centralized federalism was the state's only means to 
consolidate and build the Nigerian nation and prevent any future territorial fragmentation. 
This 'Holding Together' federalism was institutionalized in the 1979 constitution, and 
subsequently the 1999 constitution. The second independent variable, the oil-economy, 
reinforced centnlization by fiscally propping up the 'Holding Together' , centralized 
institutions that were constructed after the civil war. By immersing the state in the oil 
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sector, the federal government gave itself enough wealth and financial capacity to both 
perpetuate and further entrench centralization well into the 1990's. The third independent 
variable, the constraints of decentralization and economic refom1, highlights the notion 
that moving away from the present centralized, market-distorting model requires the 
consent of many actors and institutions, who in many ways, have no incentive to change 
the current system. Sub-national governments, state-owned companies, rent-seeking 
bureaucrats, and the private sector all continue to constrain decentralization because they 
continue to benefit from the over-centralized status quo. Hence, despite the international 
trend to do the contrary, Nigeria remains centralized. 
As predicted by the political economy of federalism school, the effects of this 
centralization on the evolution of Nigerian federalism are thus obvious. Not only has 
fiscal centralization induced transfer dependence, but it has produced an array of actors, 
institutions and interests that benefit from its fiscal distortions. Public sector spending, to 
no surprise, ref!1ains uncontrollable, and this will continue to harm the fiscal, monetary, 
and macroeconomic well-being of the federation. Similarly, by entrenching the central 
government in shipping, power, policing, and petroleum services, the state has 
undermined basic service delivery. These services have not only become ineffective and 
inefficient, but they continue to cost the government billions of Naira yearly. Likewise, in 
centralizing and becoming overly dependent on the oil-sector as a source of revenue, the 
central government attached the entire federation to the volatility of oil prices. 
In documenting why Nigerian federalism remains centralized and highlighting its 
accompanying affects, my research hopes to add to the contemporary literature in two 
ways. First, as Erik Wibbels points out, there exists little analysis into the affects that 
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federal processes can have on decentralization and economic reform, particularly in 
developing federations. Hence, my analysis of the effects of centralization in Nigerian 
federalism is both timely and relevant. Second, this research hopes to add to the 
expanding literature around the new political economy of federalism. As conceptualized 
earlier, more and more analysis is highlighting the "distinctly federal roots" of the 
political and economic challenges facing federations (Wibbels, 2005). And given it is the 
conviction of this research that centralization has negatively affected the political and 
economic evolution of Nigerian federalism, the paper appears quite applicable to 
contemporary debates. 
Overall, despite a weak attempt to privatize the exorbitant number of centrally-
controlled services and organizations in 1986, Nigeria remains politically and 
economically centralized to this day (Obi, 2007). 17 Although the central state continues to 
gradually implement public sector refon11S into the 21 51 century, the process remains 
constrained by a number of actors from both the public and private sector. And as this 
paper has shown, there exist three main variables that explain why this is so. However, 
the long term impact of institutional deprivation at the sub-national and local level 
remains to be seen. 
Like many of the countries in the developing world, the recession that began in 
2008 will undoubtedly affect the rate of foreign investment into Nigeria. Accompanying 
this decline in investment is the dramatic drop in the world's oil prices in late 2008. As a 
result, in early 2009, the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) All Share Index witnessed a 
dramatic 37% decline, the worst of eighty-nine benchmark indexes covered by 
17 Cyri l Obi's "The Nigerian Private Sector under Adjustment and Crisis: 1985 - 1993" provides a good 
overview of the privatization process in the early 1990's 
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Bloomberg (Edward , 2009). It has also been estimated that the NSE has fallen by nearly 
67% from its pre-cri is levels (Edwards, 2009). All these processes are expected to have 
dramatic affect upon the economy and the tate' ability to provide even the most basic 
ervJCeS. 
At the beginning of 2009, the central government openly declared that the state 
had dramatically run short of foreign reserves. Similarly, the Naira continue . to flucuate 
with oil prices as the central authorities have failed to adequately diver ify the economy 
beyond the oil ector. An intense bout of inflation is practically inevitable (Faturoti and 
Yusuf, 2009). 
All funds aved by the central authority in the excess crude account have also 
been depleted, as the $20 billion savings recorded in 2009 has been depleted to just $3 
billion in 20 J 0 (Ab.ubakar and Ahmed, 20 I 0). ome states have also failed to receive 
billions of dollars in transfei· revenue since January 2009 (Gabriel, Ujah, Akoni , 2009). 
Likewise, a of April 20 I 0, speculation continue to surround the ability of tates of to 
pay the salarie of sub-national civil crvants (Abubakar and Ahmed, 20 J 0). 
Consequentially, a of March 2009, the central government is expected to run a budget 
deficit of up to N836.6 billion, or 5.5 billion dollar , which docs not include the 
potential fund that will be spent on a banking timulus package of upwards of 955 
billion, equal to nearly $6.2 billion dollar (Nwojil , 2009; Komolafc and Henry, 2009). 
This is all occurring despite the warnings issued by former Central Bank Governor 
Chukwuma C. Soludo in early 2009 in regards to the rapid depletion of the excess crude 
account. Similar predictions have been made by the Benue state mini tcr of finance, 
Remi Babalola, who has recently urged state " to explore sources of revenue outside of 
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the federation account" (Gabri l, Ujah, Akoni , 2009). The same finance minister has a lso 
called for "an urgent paradigm shift" in fisca l relations, claiming that "any continued 
dependence on the federation account allocation as a means of funding a state's 
expenditure is unrealistic" (Gabri l, Ujah, Akoni , 2009). In 2010, a govemment official 
was also quoted as stating that "unless states aggressively embark on harnessing their 
intem ally generated revenue and relying less on revenue from the federation account, 
they may also not be able to execute any capital projects for the rest of the year" 
(Abubakar and Ahmed, 201 0). 
The lack of state capacity apparent since N igeria's inception, and subsequent 
centralization, has pushed the country to the brink. The recent fi nancial meltdown will 
only exacerbate these trends. The consequences explored in the previous section can only 
be expected to grow in intensity and magnitude. 
Despite calls for greater state entrepreneur ism, the rational and historical roots of 
centraliza tion continue to plague the country in the future. The emphasis on institutional 
integration and centralized administration, as a means to subdue ethnic hostili ty and hold 
the state together, has produced an economically unsustainable federation that wil l 
continue to neglect the intricate particularities of sub-national units . Similarly, the 
entrenchrrient of the central government in sub-national finance, as well as the oi l, 
shipping, and power sectors, has produced multiple actors and institutions that benefit 
from these fiscal and economic distortions. 
In conclusion, the experiences ofNigerian federalism make evident the realities of 
the 21st century post-welfare state. While centralization remains a political facet of 
N igerian history, its deleterious affects on federali sm have been explained. Despite the 
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prospects of devolution highlighted above by Minister Babalola, history continues to 
manifest itself in the political and economic instability of the tate. Whether 
decentralization and devolution is a reali tic pro pect remains to be een. However, given 
the country's tumultuous and violent federal history, such reform may continue to be 
opposed. And ifthe political economy of federalism view is COITect, uch oppo ition will 
continue to perpetuate the inefficiencies thi research has documented. 
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Figure one: 1ap of 'igeria's ethnic groups produced by the Willink Commission in 1958. 
Source: Urlwho Historical Sociezr. 11'11"11'. \l'aodu.org 
Map 1: Nigeria 1954 
Figure two: Tripartite structure institutionulized with the 1946 Rich:u·ds Constitution 
Source: Urhobo Historical Society. reproduced ji-um lflillle1jorce Conference on Niger ian Federalism (1997) 
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Figu re three: Twelve-state federation decreed IJy t he Gowon Administ ration in 1967 
Source: Urlwho Hislorical Sociely. reproduced.fi'om /997 IJiilhe1jorce conference 011 Nigerian Federalism (I 'J97) 
States of Nigeria 
1976 - 23 Sep. 1987 
Figure four: Nineteen-state structure created IJy Mohammed administration in 1976 (add it ion of seven states) 
Source: "Sia/es ofNigeria " (2010) Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundcllionlnc. 
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States of Nigeria 
23 Sep. 1987- 27 Aug . 1991 
Figure five: Two new states plus Federal Capital Territory created in 1987 
Source: "Slates o_j'Nigeria .. (2010) Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation /ne, 
States of Nigeria 
27 Aug. 1991 - 1 Oct. 1996 
Figure six: Eight new states created by Babangida administration 
Source: "Stales of Nigeria .. (20 I 0) Wikipedio, Wikimedia Foundation Inc 
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Map 3: Nigeria 1 097 
Figure seven: Thirty-Six state federation completed by the Abacha administration in 1996 
Source: Urhubo Historico/ Socie~)', reproducedji-om Wilbe,force con/'erence on Nigerian Federalism ( /997) 
State Year Created Preceding State 
Abia State 1991 lmo State 
Adamawa State 1991 Gongola State 
Akwa lbom State 1987 Cross River State 
Anambra State 1991 Anambara State (old) 
Bauchi State 1976 N011h-Eastern State 
Bayelsa State 1996 Rivers State 
Benue State 1976 Benue-Piateau State 
Borno State 1976 N011h-Eastern State 
Cross-River State 1967 Eastem Region 
Delta State 1991 Bendel State 
Ebonyi State 1996 Enugu State and Abia State 
Edo State 1991 Bendel State 
Ekiti State 1996 Ondo State 
Enugu State 1991 Anambara State (old) 
Gombe State 1996 Bauchi State 
lmo State 1976 East-Central State 
J igawa State 1991 Kano State 
Kaduna State 1967 N011hern Regio11 
Kano State 1967 Not1hern Region 
Katsina State 1987 Kaduna State 
Kebbi State 1991 Sokoto State 
Kogi State 1991 Kwara State I Benue State 
Kwara State 1967 Not1hern Region 
Lagos State 1967 Federal Territory of Lagos 
Nasarawa 1996 Plateau State 
Niger State 1976 North-Western State 
Ogun State 1976 Western State 
Ondo State 1976 Western State 
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Osun State 199 1 Oyo State 
Oyo State 1976 Western Stale 
Plateau State 1976 Benue-Piateau tale 
Rivers State 1967 Eastern Region 
okoto State 1976 North-Western tale 
Taraba State 1991 Gongola Slate 
Yobe State 199 1 Borno State 
Zamfara Stale 1996 okoto State 
Abuja Federal Capital 1976 Benue- Pialeau I North-
Territory Central I North West 
Figure eight : List of states by yc:tr crc:ll cd nnd p receding stnte of origin 
Source: "Usr u,f'Nigerian Sf ares hy Dole r!f'S!alelwod" (2009) Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation Inc. 
80 



